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ARGUMENT 
I. The Griffiths Appellees due process argument is not based upon any 
facts in the record and is legally deficient 
The Griffiths Parties argue that new parcel numbers were assigned by 
Weber County to the portions of the disputed property described in the tax deeds. 
They argue that therefore they would not be able to ascertain from a search of the 
Weber County Recorder's Office that Masseys claimed title under their tax deeds 
to the property Griffiths contemplated purchasing and Griffiths therefore had no 
notice of Masseys' claim to the disputed property. This entire argument is made 
without any reference to the record or to controlling authority. 
The law does not require County Recorders to index property by parcel 
number. See Utah Code § 17-21-6. To demonstrate the absurdity of Griffiths5 
argument, two plat maps from the Weber County Recorder's Office are appended 
hereto as addendum No. one, showing the location of the Massey tax deeds, both 
before the tax sale or the purchase of the Griffiths Parties, and following the tax 
sale and the purchase of the Griffiths Parties. Contrary to their unsupported 
allegation that they had no way to obtain notice, a simple review of the plat map in 
the County Recorders Office would have provided the same. 
There is nothing in the record or in the argument of the Griffiths Parties 
that supports their position regarding parcel numbers. 
l 
II. Appellees reliance upon precedent is not persuasive. 
Appellees rely upon two Utah cases, Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. 
Ercanbrack 74 P.2d 1184 (Utah 1938) and Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781 (Utah 
1946). Ercanbrack dealt with title to Mining claims, not fee title. In that case the 
Court relied upon the rule of "strictisimi juris" in construing the tax sale 
proceedings and statutes. As pointed out in Masseys' opening brief, strict 
construction of tax sale proceedings and statutes is no longer the law in Utah, if it 
ever was. See Brief for Appellants at 7-10. 
Hayes v. Gibbs is distinguished from the present case in that it dealt with 
the issue of whether tax sales extinguish covenants, conditions and restrictions 
( CC&R's ). It likened CC&R's to easements and held that like easements, 
CC&R's are not extinguished by tax sale proceedings. The Court's holding was 
based upon the theory that only the servient estate is assessed and taxed, and hence 
subject to sale. Hayes v. Gibbs at 786-88. That is not at issue in the present case. 
The Nevada case cited by and relied upon by all Appellees, Thirteen South 
Ltd. v. Summit Village Inc., 866 P.2d 257 (Nev. 1993) also deals with CC&R's 
and cites Hayes v. Gibbs as one of the persuasive authorities for its holding. 
Thirteen South Ltd. is of little assistance to the analysis of the issues in the present 
case. 
Both groups of Appellees rely upon Mason v. Loveless, 24 P.3d 997 (Utah 
App. 2001) for the proposition that boundaries established by acquiescence control 
for purposes of tax sale proceedings. The Buttars parties go so far as to cite Mason 
v. Loveless as holding that "purchasers of Tax Deeds take title subject to and along 
with all of the infirmities of the prior owner." Brief of Buttars Parties at 10. That 
assertion is not supported by the courts two paragraphs dealing with the tax deed 
issue. Mason v. Loveless does not deal with the issue of subsequent purchasers 
taking subject to constructive notice of the recorded tax deed titles. Nor does it 
deal with the proposition that a litigant may only assert his own constitutional 
rights or immunities and has no standing to assert a third-party's constitutional 
rights. See Brief of Appellants at 11. Thus Mason v. Loveless is not dispositive of 
the issues in the present case. 
III. The record below does not support Appellees' assertion that the tax deeds 
are void and of no legal effect to convey title to Masseys. 
Paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 of the Statement of Facts in the brief of the Buttars 
Parties state as facts numerous items that are not undisputed facts before this court. 
The Buttars Parties allege that "an expert surveyor has concluded that Weber 
County did not have any interest in the property to be conveyed at the tax sale and 
that the deeds to property allegedly conveyed were based on a conveyance made 
by an earlier grantor possessing no interest in the real property to be conveyed." 
3 
Brief of Buttars Parties at 5. This statement is inaccurate in at least two regards. 
First, it has not been established that Weber County "did not have any interest in 
the property to be conveyed." The legal opinion of Appellees surveyor in an 
affidavit appended to their brief below is insufficient for that purpose. The 
allegation that the tax deeds were "based on a conveyance made by an earlier 
grantor possessing no interest in the real property to be conveyed" was disputed by 
Masseys' expert and was formally disputed by Masseys in their brief in opposition 
to the motion for summary judgment. R. at 821-22. The statements of Ms. Segriff 
quoted in paragraph 10 are not statements of undisputed facts and are explained 
and disputed in Masseys' brief below. R. at 820-21. Likewise, defendants 
allegation contained in paragraph 11 are misstatements of undisputed facts and 
were disputed by Masseys below. R. at 821-22. 
There is nothing in the record regarding the procedure by which Weber 
County arrived at holding tax title to the property in question and conveying it to 
Masseys. The tax sale proceedings and tax deeds are entitled to a presumption of 
regularity. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-1351.1 (9)(b) and 59-2-1362. 
IV. The Buttars Appellees' reliance upon Salt Lake County v. Metro West 
Ready Mix Inc. is misplaced. 
The Buttars Appellees spend a substantial portion of their brief arguing the 
application of Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix Inc., 89 P.3d 155 (Utah 
2004) to the fact situation in the present case. Masseys have no argument with 
Metro West. In fact Metro West supports Masseys' position that Appellees are 
bound by the recording statutes and that their interests are subject to the interest of 
Masseys under their tax deeds. This is because Masseys' deeds are not "wild 
deeds" but are from the sovereign and they take "new and complete title in the 
land, under an independent grant from the sovereign authority, which bars or 
extinguishes all prior titles and encumbrances of private persons, and all equity 
arising out of them." Hanson v. Burr is, 46 P.2d 400, 406 (Utah 1935) (citations 
omitted); accord, A.C. Financial, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771 (Utah 
1997); Buchanan v. Hansen, 820 P.2d 908, 910 (Utah 1991); Tuft v. Federal 
Leasing, 657 P. 2d 1300, 1303 (Utah 1982). 
V. Public Policy favors a high degree of protection for tax deeds and 
will be furthered by reversing the lower Courts decision. 
Appellees suggest that Appellant has collected random comments from 
Utah Case Law concerning tax deeds and their sanctity. Masseys suggest that 
these are not mere random comments, but express the public policy of this State. 
Public policy should not favor grantees taking title to real property without finding 
what was clearly of record to be found: Masseys'tax deeds. They were not 
deprived of their property by due process. The tax deeds were of record and their 
conflicting legal descriptions were there to be found. 
5 
VI. Appellants are not required to object to the trial court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
Appellees argue that Appellants cannot question the lower court's findings, 
conclusions and judgment, because Appellants failed to object to the same. Appellees 
cite no authority for their proposition and Appellants know of none. 
CONCLUSION 
To assure the governments ability to raise revenue by levying and collecting taxes 
on real property, Utah law strongly favors the stability and priority of tax titles. Indeed a 
tax title is a new title issued by the sovereign. The defendants in this case, who all 
acquired their interests by conveyances dated after the recording of Masseys tax titles, 
took subject to those titles. The Defendants have failed to carry their burden of 
demonstrating how undisputed material facts and the law support their motions for 
summary judgment. The trial court erred in granting those motions. The trial court's 
Findings of Fact should be stricken and its Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
reversed. The matter should be remanded to the trial court for further scheduling and 
trial. 
1 T 
DATED this ]_ day of June, 2005. 
Frank S. Warner 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
1. WEBER COUNTY RECORDER PLAT. 
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